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 Most philosophical discussions of abortion focus on the harms and rights of the 
individual women and fetuses directly involved.  They concentrate on the questions of whether 
the fetus is a person, or whether it is a being sufficiently like persons to deserve a right to life, 
and whether the rights of the fetus are counterbalanced by the women's right to privacy or 
freedom from interference.
2
  These are undoubtedly important questions, yet there is another 
important argument, employed by the pro-choice political community, which has been left out of 
the philosophical debate.  The argument claims to show that women as a group are harmed when 
they are not permitted to control their reproduction.  The claim is that enforcing pregnancy 
degrades women in such a way that all women are harmed, and not just those who become 
pregnant against their will. 
 How are we to conceive of women?  Is their capacity for bearing children to be their 
most essential feature, or is it to be, like that of men, their capacity for free moral choice and the 
prima facie obligation of respect owed them?  What is the worth of women relative to men?  
Are women in this society to be the breeding stock at the whim of men or the state or other 
women, or are they to be autonomous with respect to their reproduction?  These questions force 
us to examine the consequences of enforced pregnancy, or any pregnancy which a woman is 
forced to endure without her consent, and hence abortion. 
 In this paper I shall make the argument that the image of woman is seriously degraded by 
enforcing pregnancy, and that because of this degradation all women, not only those who become 
pregnant and must carry a fetus to term against their will, are wronged.  An argument along this 
line has been made for rape, namely, that rape robs all women of essential human rights and 
depicts women as primarily sexual servants of men.  And rape, as we shall see, has important 
analogies to enforced pregnancy in other ways as well.  In order to make the argument, I will 
need to examine the notion of group harm, especially group harms which degrade the defining 
image of that group.  I will then reconstruct the argument that rape harms all women and 
seriously degrades the image of woman, and construct the analogous argument for enforced 
pregnancy.  Finally, I will draw out the implications of this discussion for the abortion debate.  
 
 I. Group harm and degradation 
 The harm which I will argue all women suffer as a result of rape or enforced pregnancy 
has special political and social significance because of the nature of the group and the harm.  To 
suffer harm as a group is to be a member of a group which is harmed.  This harm may or may 
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 2 
not have any political or moral significance, depending on the identity conditions of the group 
and the way the harm is inflicted.  For example, the harm to a group of otherwise unrelated 
airline passengers in a crash has no particular political significance, unless the crash was caused 
by international terrorism, or the plane was shot down because of its nationality.  To distinguish 
those cases in which there is some particular political or moral significance to both the group and 
the harm, I shall call these harms 'group harms'.  Group harms are harms inflicted by social 
practices, suffered by the members of a group by virtue of their membership in that group, which 
is identifiable independently of any particular harm. 
 Three aspects of this definition are worth highlighting.  First, in order for a group harm 
to occur, the identity of the group must be definable independently of the situation in which they 
are harmed.  If the passengers in our example are only identifiable as a group because they are 
passengers, they suffer harm as a group, but not group harm.  Second, the members of a group 
have to suffer harms because they belong to that group.  In the airline example, if the passengers 
are from a national or ethnic group which is the target of terrorism, then they suffer group harm.  
 Finally, group harms must be embodied and structured in social practices.  Group harms, to 
have moral or political significance, must have a social origin and meaning.  The harms must be 
a part of the social order in some regular way, so that the harms are a part of the group's normal 
social activities, and not accidents unrelated to the group's social position.  Natural disasters, for 
example, do not cause group harms, though they harm groups which are identifiable indepen-
dently of the harms.
3
  
 This definition is sufficient to pick out those harms that have political significance, but 
not to pick out those harms that degrade the group.  To degrade someone is to lower that person 
in worth or dignity relative to others.
4
  Degradation can be either an objective or a subjective 
injury.  It is objective when the person's worth is actually lowered, when the person is made or 
shown to be less valuable.  Degradation is a subjective injury when the victim is made to feel 
less worthy, or treated in a way that the victim believes is beneath her dignity.  Degrading 
injuries can thus involve either or both objective and subjective degradation.  One can feel 
degraded when one is treated in a way that is in fact appropriate, and one can fail to feel degraded 
when one is treated in a demeaning inappropriate way believing that the treatment is deserved 
and appropriate to one's status.   
 Since it involves the worth and especially the relative worth of persons, an understanding 
of degradation involves a conception of human worth.  There are many ways human worth has 
been defined and compared in the history of social thought.  My interest here is in the concep-
tions of human worth that are prevalent and justifiable in modern western democratic societies.  
Different aspects of social life involve different conceptions of human worth.  The American 
legal conception of worth is deeply egalitarian, as the founding creed states in the Declaration of 
Independence that "all men are created equal".  The worth of men on this account is determined 
by their intrinsic value as human beings, qualities "endowed by their creator".  The equality 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution is equality of rights under the law.  As long as one is 
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granted these rights one is treated with equal respect
5
; to degrade one is on this account to deny 
one legal rights as set out in the Constitution or by legislative bodies in the U.S..  But who 
counts as "men" has changed over time, and this has only been clarified somewhat by 
amendments to the Constitution.  It is not clear to what extent women are included, since the 
major attempt to make their inclusion explicit with the Equal Rights Amendment was defeated.  
I shall argue that the struggle over enforced pregnancy is a part of the struggle over whether 
women are indeed part of the class called "men" in our founding creed.   
 Our common understanding of moral worth has egalitarian and inegalitarian aspects.  On 
most moral theories the moral worth of a person depends on some more or less exercised 
capacity for moral choice and moral responsibility.  Kant, for example, holds that practical 
rationality is required for one to be worthy of the respect owed to persons, but one must have a 
good will, that is, guide one's actions according to duty (i.e. in accordance with the moral law) 
for the sake of duty to be morally good.  Similarly, Christians distinguish the faithful from the 
faithless holding that only those who have faith will receive the ultimate moral prize of eternal 
life.  They also distinguish saints from sinners, though, according to how well they live up to the 
teachings of Christ.  Though some Christian sects believe that any human being can choose to 
have faith, Calvinists held that one had to be predestined by God to be the faithful.  Virtue 
theories distinguish the virtuous from the vicious, the intemperate from the incontinent.  It is 
best, morally speaking to be virtuous and continent, and vice and incontinence are reasons for 
one to feel shame.  A common thread in these moral theories is that while humans are rarely if 
ever morally perfect, there is a clear line distinguishing those who can always choose morality 
and those who cannot, those who can make moral choices for themselves and those for whom 
choices have to be made by the ones morally more worthy, those who have free will and those 
who are so controlled by unworthy, instinctual urges that they may not be said to make 
responsible choices.  This points to an intrinsic feature of human worth separating moral adults 
from lesser beings, and defining an egalitarian sense of worth for the moral adults.  For Kant it is 
the capacity for rationality.  For Calvin it is being chosen by God.  In our modern secular 
conception of morality, it is the capacity for moral agency. 
 A third sphere of life in which a theory of human worth plays an important role is the 
socio-economic sphere.  Here a person's worth, to paraphrase Hobbes, is her price, or the 
economic value of her labor and her property.  This is a non-egalitarian theory of instrumental 
worth, since the value of a person's property depends on the ability she has to satisfy others' ends 
with her labor or wealth.  The labor of the steelworker is valuable because it makes something 
that people will buy, that they will use in turn to serve some other end.   
 There are different senses of degradation which correspond to these different conceptions 
of human worth.  On inegalitarian conceptions, one is degraded when one is judged to be of 
lower value or rank.  On egalitarian conceptions, though, one can only be degraded by being 
excluded from the set of equals.  Degradation wrongs someone only if it causes undeserved pain 
or loss of self worth or social worth.  If one's actions warrant a lowering of esteem, though, 
because they are illegal, immoral, or inefficient, then the corresponding legal, moral, or economic 
degradation does not do one wrong. 
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 The discussion of degradation has so far concentrated on individuals, but it may be 
extended to groups through the concepts of group harm and group image.  A group is degraded 
when their image is lowered in worth relative to that of other groups.  By 'image of a group' I 
shall refer to the cluster of stereotypic features with which members of a group are identified.  
Degradation of the image of women is the very deep and subtle harm which I will claim that rape 
and enforced pregnancy cause.  Returning to the airline terrorism example, let us suppose that 
the passengers were all from, say, country A which has some significant power over the group 
with which the terrorists identify.  It is not likely that the surviving compatriots of the passengers 
feel degradation as citizens of country A.  Some of them may feel fear, but not degradation.  For 
a group harm to degrade the image of the group itself, all members of the group must suffer the 
group harm, and the group must be identified by some features which are sufficiently essential to 
its members' self-identity.  Furthermore, it must be a group which lacks power vis-a-vis at least 
some other group in society, in particular any group perpetrating the harm or gaining by it.  The 
group at the top cannot suffer group harm which degrades them at the hands of others, though 
they may (objectively, relative to some moral conceptions of human worth) degrade themselves 
by being an oppressor group.
6
 
 Various social structures may cause degrading group harms.  Stereotypes of blacks as 
lazy or violent harms all individual blacks.  A practice of discrimination against the elderly in 
employment harms all elderly persons.  In both cases the group is in a relatively powerless 
position.  These structures reinforce a negative stereotype about these groups, degrading the 
social perception of their groups in a downward spiral.  Blacks who cannot work because they 
are seen as lazy appear to be lazy because they don't work.  The elderly who cannot work 
because of discrimination appear to themselves and others to be unable to work. 
 Some group harms are more subtle than others.  There is nothing subtle about an airline 
crash, but general fear, lowered expectations, and institutionalized discrimination are often 
hidden from the casual or unwilling observer, and sometimes even from the victims themselves.  
Friedman and May (1985) identify three kinds of evidence which together, they argue, points to 
degrading group harm: (1) direct harms suffered by some members of the group; (2) evidence of 
interrelationships among group members which transmits harm to the other members of the 
group consequent on the direct harms; (3) evidence of a culturally pervasive negative stereotype 
of the members of the group.
7
  Their specific interest is the harm suffered by women as a result 
of sex discrimination in employment and education, but it can be shown that this kind of 
evidence is available in the cases of rape and enforced pregnancy. 
 Degrading group harms are social or political problems which require solutions more 
extensive than mere compensation to individuals who are directly harmed.  Since the entire 
group is harmed, the entire group is owed compensation.  Countering degradation requires that 
the worth of the group be raised, and though this may not be difficult to do in law, it is difficult 
to change the minds of people who have degraded or been degraded that the judgment of relative 
worth was wrong.  Since the harm is inflicted by a social practice, it is more deeply entrenched 
than individual instances of criminal behavior, passionate transgressions, or momentary lapses.  
                     
6.Frye (1983) provides a useful discussion of oppression, which I had in mind while writing this 
section. 
7.Friedman and May (1985), p.221. 
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And because of the downward spiral effect on the perception of these groups, the effects are long 
lasting, pervasive, and often subtle. 
 
 II. Rape 
 Rape is a crime against women.  Individual men may also be raped, but the crime is seen 
as directed especially against women.  The victims of rape are considered womanish -- weak, 
passive, available.  Men are victims only in situations in which others have power over them -- 
they are smaller than their attackers on average, and in a situation in which there is little chance 
for them to get help quickly, or to take revenge on the assailant.
8
  And their attackers are almost 
always men.  In such situations they are, in the relevant ways, women.
9
 
 Rape constitutes a practice in our society.
10
  A practice is structured by a system of rules, 
and given its meaning by those rules.  The rules which structure rape are popular sexist morality, 
and the dominant ideology of sexuality.  According to the dominant attitudes, men are 
aggressive and initiate sex, while women are passive and (at least initially) resist.  Men are 
supposed to be sexually excited by the idea of forced intercourse, and women are supposed to 
secretly long for it.  Intercourse is spontaneous; no good sex is sex which one has the time to 
consent to.  In an interesting inconsistency, though, it is also a popular view that when women 
say 'no' they mean 'yes', and thus no sex is sex to which a woman didn't really consent.
11
  Rape 
turns out to be impossible!  In popular culture the practice of sexuality, structured by our 
understanding of the sexuality of men and women and what constitutes normal sexual behavior, 
is the practice of rape.  That is not to say that every act of intercourse is rape, but rather, that the 
norm of sexuality includes nonconsensual sex, i.e. rape.  Rape by a stranger falls outside that 
norm, of course, but it is not a wide conceptual leap from the 'norm' of forcing intercourse on the 
first date to the crime of raping a stranger. 
 Popular sexist morality considers rape to be, if not the just desert, then certainly a 
predictable result, for women who dare to assert their rights to be as free as men.  Women who 
walk alone through dark streets, who go out alone at night, who dress in a certain way, who run 
in quiet deserted parks, or who are friendly to strangers are often chastised as somehow partly to 
blame if they are raped.  Rapists have been found innocent by juries who judged that the victim 
was too loose, or was asking for it.
12
  Women may not do things that men take for granted. 
                     
8.Brownmiller (1975), p.258. 
9.Frye and Shafer (1977) make this point, as well.  See p.334. 
10.Peterson (1977), p.361.  She goes on to argue that through rape the state is a like coercive 
protection racket, which denies women the protection necessary for them to be full members of 
the society, and for the state to have legitimacy.  We shall make a similar argument for the 
illegitimacy of the state which enforces pregnancy. 
11.Meuhlenhard and Hollabaugh (1988) provides evidence that some women in fact do say 'no' 
when they mean 'yes', and that this phenomenon is linked to the sexual double standard that it is 
okay for men to have sex outside of marriage, but not for women.  They cite a figure of about 
37% of women have at one time said 'no' when they meant 'yes', but the all-important figure for 
what percentage of the time women say 'no' meaning 'yes' is not available. 
12.In a recent rape case the jury acquitted the accused rapist on the grounds that the woman 
"asked for it by the way she dressed."  See Boston Globe, "Jury Stirs Furor by Citing Dress in 
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 Rape is also a practice in less subtle ways.  Among some men rape is an expected rite of 
manhood, which is required for group membership or even self-respect.  Fraternity parties, 
bachelor parties, and "wilding" incidents like the one that ended in the rape of a jogger in Central 
Park are situations in which men find it necessary to rape to maintain self-respect and group 
membership.
13
  For some male victims of oppression, rape is seen as a way of getting revenge or 
of recovering lost masculinity.  Eldridge Cleaver (1968) writes of how he once saw rape of 
white women as a way of getting revenge on white men, and of restoring his self-esteem lost 
through racial discrimination.  "Rape was an insurrectionary act.  It delighted me that I was 
defying and trampling upon the white man's law, upon his system of values, and that I was 
defiling his women." (p.14)  
 The evidence that rape presents group harm to women can now be summarized in the 
terms Friedman and May laid out.  First it is clear that many women are directly harmed by rape. 
 Second, women have close relationships with other women which transmits that harm in the 
form of mutual fear and reproach.  Women constantly warn each other about what they cannot 
do if they want not to be raped, they speculate about the transgressions of those who are raped, 
and in these and other ways further promulgate the stereotypes of women and sexuality which 
structure the practice of rape.  Third, the fact that only women are raped reinforces the negative 
stereotypes of women as weak, vulnerable, passive, and sexual. 
 The result of rape is that women are not as free as men.  They cannot go out alone, or 
with men they don't know, or even with men they do know without fearing for their safety.  In an 
article entitled "How Bad is Rape?" H.E. Baber (1987) claims that what is bad about rape is what 
happens to the individual victims, and this is not as bad as many other things which can befall 
someone.  But this article misses the group harms which rape causes all women: their lack of 
freedom in movement, and their need constantly to beware of all men as potential rapists.  
 But even worse than the group harms alone is the degradation that women collectively 
suffer as a result of rape.  Since women are the beings who are harmed in this way, they come to 
be seen as in need of protection, as weak and passive, and available to all men.  Men and women 
alike see women as potential rape victims.  People interfere in women's lives as one would in a 
child's or a dependent's life.  Women are scolded for behavior which, in a man, would never be 
questioned.  But women are also, if they are to have a "normal sexuality", supposed to attract the 
spontaneous lust of men.  Thus women, whether as victims or as attractors, are seen as primarily 
sexual beings, who have no power of consent in that sexuality. 
 
 III. Enforced pregnancy 
 An enforced pregnancy is any pregnancy during which a woman is forced to continue the 
pregnancy against her will, or for which she has lost control of her care and maintenance to 
someone else against her will.  Enforced pregnancies occur whenever safe and effective abortion 
is illegal or unavailable.  They also occur when the state or a state appointed agency wrests 
control of a pregnant woman's care and maintenance from the woman herself without her 
consent.  Thus enforced pregnancy happens today in this country wherever women are too far 
from a clinic, or are unaware of their options, or haven't the necessary funds to obtain an 
                                                                  
Rape Acquittal", Oct. 6, 1989, p.12, col.1. 
13.Ehrhart and Sandler (1986). 
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abortion, or are manipulated by persons with enough power over them to carry an unwanted preg-
nancy to term.  It also happens, although more rarely, when a woman is jailed to prevent her 
from using alcohol or drugs during a pregnancy, or when a woman is compelled to undergo a 
Cesarean section or to lie quietly in bed for the duration of her pregnancy.
14
 
 Some will object to my notion of enforced pregnancy by pushing back the point of choice 
to the act of intercourse.  Women who abstain from intercourse, they will say, do not become 
pregnant.  Women make their choice for pregnancy when they consent to intercourse.  There are 
several responses to be made here.  First, I have argued that women do not control sexuality, so 
often they cannot choose to abstain, they can only do their best to avoid all situations in which 
they might be physically overpowered or emotionally coerced, though this is no guarantee against 
rape.  Second, there are cases in which women are largely responsible for their unwanted 
pregnancy, but it cannot be denied that there are ways of ending pregnancies before birth -- 
women have been doing it for thousands of years.  So there is the possibility and it must be 
actively denied, and strenuously at that, to take it away from women.  Any pregnancy which the 
woman is prevented from ending is thus an enforced one.
15
  One may want to argue that the 
enforcement of pregnancy is justifiable, but one cannot deny that the denial of abortion services 
to women is enforced pregnancy. 
 Enforced pregnancy is a practice which is structured by two sets of rules.  One is the 
popular notion of (heterosexual) sexuality discussed above, which demands that men be the 
initiators, but that women be responsible for contraception.  But contraception, in its least 
intrusive and most popular forms, requires forethought or planning.  If sex must "just happen", 
then contraception most likely won't be used.   
 The other set of rules are those concerning pregnancy and motherhood.  Pregnancy is 
seen as something "natural" and expected for women.
16
  And though there is some grain of truth 
to these things -- it is indeed biologically possible, and in that sense natural, for women to have 
children, (a sense of "natural" shared with death, for instance), and most women do -- the unwar-
                     
14.LaCroix (1989) reports that: "hospitals have sought and obtained court orders for Caesarean 
sections, intrauterine transfusions and hospital detention of pregnant women against their will.  
Court order for Caesareans were granted in all but one of fifteen instances." (p.586)  One of 
these Caesareans was performed on Angela Carder, a leukemia victim who died on the operating 
table.  Duke (1987) reports the state's position in this case: "Appeals Court Judge Frank Q. 
Nebeker wrote that 'with an unborn child, the state's interest in preserving the health of the 
unborn child may run squarely against the mother's interest in her bodily integrity.'" (p.1) 
15.I am distinguishing 'forced' pregnancy, which results from forced sexual intercourse, from 
'enforced' pregnancy, which means that the woman is prevented from ending the pregnancy 
completely apart from the circumstances of the intercourse.   
16.I have heard it commented that pregnancy is an "ordinary" not an "extraordinary" occurrence 
for women today.  This is the same sort of claim that it is natural for women.  If it means that it 
happens all the time to women like breathing or eating then it is false.  And if it means that it is 
not onerous or dangerous, again it is false.  More likely it means that most women don't die from 
pregnancy today.  That is true for women who can rely on decent emergency medical care, but 
then most people with similar access to care don't die from severing their spines, but that can 
hardly be called an ordinary occurrence. 
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ranted inference is made from pregnancy's naturalness to the claim that it is not harmful, even 
that it is good for women.  A woman who has not had children is seen as incomplete; a woman 
who does not want to be pregnant doesn't quite know what is good for her. 
 Pregnancy is a dangerous and often onerous task for a person.  She may feel that she 
loses bodily integrity and freedom of movement, she suffers physical pain and discomfort, and 
may risk serious illness or death.  If she is wealthy or well-insured she either must submit herself 
to the frequent, often intrusive, examinations by physicians and their restrictive instructions, or 
risk taking an alternative and less socially acceptable route with her care.  And if she is poor 
then she may not be able to afford the care necessary to lessen the risks of pregnancy for herself 
or the fetus.  In any case she is likely to be discriminated against in employment and education, 
find it more difficult to be taken seriously, and be given unsolicited advice from all directions.  
All this suggests outstanding heroism, but pregnant women are not accorded heroic status 
because it is expected of them, and what they really want anyway.
17
 
 Enforced pregnancy causes group harm to all women.  The women who are forced to 
continue a pregnancy against their will are directly harmed by it.  These harms transmit more 
subtle and indirect ones through women's identification with each other as potential victims.  
Finally, there is a pervasive negative stereotype of women as breeders, as potential mothers.  
This stereotype must be seen as negative because it is limiting.  Women are discriminated 
against in employment, for instance, because of their capacity to be pregnant, and even more so 
when they can be forced to take any pregnancy to term.  In this way enforced pregnancy 
degrades women economically. 
 As rape makes women sexual objects for men, so enforced pregnancy makes them the 
breeding stock of men and the state.  A group of persons who are available to be used by others 
is degraded morally, since they are not, in themselves, worthy of dignity and respect.  There are 
other important analogies and interconnections between the two cases.  Rape and unwanted 
pregnancy divide women into two groups: "good women" who stay out of the streets and seek the 
protection of men, who are chaste except in the confines of a secure relationship, and "bad 
women" who dare to be as free as men.  The sexual double standard requires that good women 
be careful and passive, but accepting of the sexual aggression of their men and any resulting 
pregnancy.  And it requires that women take responsibility for contraception, and accept the 
greater burden in case it fails.  Forced intercourse is natural and all women secretly long to be 
forced; pregnancy is natural and all women long to give birth.  Rape and enforced pregnancy 
deny women respect, as Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn Frye (1977) write, "the ultimate disrespect is 
                     
17.Pregnant women do tend to be treated differently from non-pregnant adults, but often more 
like sick people or people to be pitied.  Elshtain (1987) and Dinnerstein (1976) discuss 
psychological reasons why mothers are not honored for their heroism. Foot (1984) likens the 
obligations of enforced pregnancy (my term, not hers) to those of the military draft for men.  
This analogy seems apt in many ways.  But one significant way in which the analogy does not 
hold is that mothers are not accorded the benefits or honors that veterans are.  Furthermore, 
while veteran status raises the worth of individual men, the capacity of women to be mothers 
lowers the worth of women economically and, if the argument of this paper is right, morally and 
socially as well. 
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the exercise of the power of consent over another person.  And this is exactly what rape is."
18
  
They might easily have added that this is enforced pregnancy as well. 
 It will be argued that an important disanalogy exists between rape and enforced 
pregnancy, in that with the former case there is an identifiable oppressor, the rapist, while in the 
latter case neither the fetus nor any particular person can be said to be the oppressor.  Enforced 
pregnancy is not an act but a condition, and in this sense it must differ from rape.  But in both 
cases the group harm is caused by social practices which benefit men.  Simply put, when women 
are degraded relative to men, men are raised in worth relative to women.  These benefits are 
gained in the legal and socio-economic spheres.  Men gain by being shown to be more equal 
than women legally, and by being "more employable", and as a result having the economic power 
to demand less domestic responsibility, and worse, to demand that women be their servants 
sexually and their willing victims of abuse.  Women are more vulnerable to men when they 
cannot control their reproduction.  Some men, and virtually no women, have the economic and 
political control to see to it that abortions are difficult or impossible to obtain.  And men control 
sexuality in this society.  As Catherine MacKinnon writes: "abortion policy has never been 
explicitly approached in the context of how women get pregnant, that is, as a consequence of 
intercourse under conditions of gender inequality; that is, as an issue of forced sex."
19
   
 The degrading group harm of enforced pregnancy is the social acceptance of the image of 
woman as breeding stock, as available to serve the interests of others in reproduction, without her 
consent.  And reinforcing the negative image of woman that rape causes, woman is seen as 
primarily sexual being.   Jeffner Allen has argued that this harm is the result of our practice of 
motherhood itself within patriarchy, and that therefore even freely chosen pregnancy harms all 
women.
20
  But it is not the very possibility of women being mothers that makes it a presumption 
that they will be, or at least that they will be whenever a man, or the state, wants them to be.  I 
think that if it were the case that women could not be forced to have children, then whether or not 
they are parents or potential parents would be less significant, as it is for men.  But this 
counterfactual is somewhat difficult to assess; women are now, as ever, forced to continue 
unwanted pregnancies, and those pregnancies are often the result of forced sex.  My claim is that 
if pregnancy were truly voluntary then it would not result in the group harm of women by causing 
them to be perceived as the breeders under the control of others.  At least they would not be 
breeding for others; much more than free abortions would have to be available for women to be 
no more the breeders of society than men are. 
 Some women today feel that pregnancy should be enforced, especially in cases where the 
pregnancy resulted from consensual sex.  Is it correct to say, then, that women are wronged by 
enforced pregnancy?  Recall the distinction we drew between objective and subjective 
degradation.  Even though these women do not feel the subjective degradation, they may well be 
objectively degraded, and are so if the argument here is right.  The response of these women can 
be explained in one of two ways.  They may recognize the degradation and feel that they deserve 
to be degraded.  But this judgment cannot be correct, since all women are degraded when only 
some could, on any reasonable moral or legal theory, be said to deserve to be degraded.  Or they 
                     
18.Shafer and Frye (1977), p.340. 
19.MacKinnon (1987), p.96. 
20.Allen (1986), see esp. p.96. 
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may overlook the degradation of enforced pregnancy, mistaking that treatment for equal 
treatment under the law or for a natural and unavoidable circumstance.  In any case, it doesn't 
really matter how women feel about their degradation -- subjugated peoples have often felt that 
their bonds are natural or deserved -- they may still be objectively degraded unjustly, and hence 
wronged. 
 Though pregnancy harms individual women, and burdens them much more than any 
reproductive task burdens men, it does not follow that women would never choose to do it in a 
situation of freedom and equality of the sexes.  It would be seen by those who do not enjoy the 
experience of the pregnancy itself as an investment for the future, or a foregoing of pleasure 
today in order to have something of value later.  And it is central to the concept of the moral 
capacity of free persons to be able to make these kinds of choices.  Pregnancy which could not 
be enforced would turn out to reaffirm women's capacity for free moral personhood, rather than 
deny it. 
 
 IV. The image of woman 
 In social life it is well known that image plays a huge role in determining how others will 
react to one's actions and words.  A person who is perceived as cool under pressure, intelligent, 
and energetic is likely to have many more and better career and educational opportunities than 
one who is perceived as easily tired and concerned by minor distractions.  The image of in-
dividuals depends largely on the image of the social groups to which they are seen as belonging.  
Ugly stereotypes form the image of many groups, while other groups attach mainly to images of 
competence, hard work, moral sensitivity, or authority.  Any group which can be named has 
what I have called a 'defining image', by which I mean the common, stereotypical, default percep-
tion that is normally conjured in one's mind when one classifies another as a member of that 
group.  I mean to distinguish this sense of "image" from the terms "essence" and "nature" insofar 
as the latter terms refer to something fixed transhistorically, perhaps even biologically.
21
  A 
group's image may have some grain of truth, but the important thing about the image is what 
about the group it singles out as significant, as defining.  The image is shaped by the beliefs 
about most of the members of the group which distinguish the group from other groups, but these 
beliefs are themselves shaped by the relative power of the groups who are being defined, and 
those doing the defining.  Any way in which one group is singled out may form part of their 
image.  
 Ideally, I suppose, the image of woman would differ little from that of person, other than 
the addition of specific biological capacities.  Most importantly, women would be seen as per-
sons, capable of moral agency, of freedom of choice, of moral heroism and failure, just as men 
are.  In our society, however, in which women are raped and pregnancy enforced, the image of 
woman is that they are, among other things, the sexual property and breeding stock of men, 
lacking the power of consent in the most intimate and consequential aspects of their lives. 
                     
21.Holmstrom (1986) discusses the term "nature" and argues that women and men can only be 
seen as having distinct natures in a socially defined way.  My term "image" is meant to avoid 
this ambiguity, as well as to suggest manipulability and connections to image-makers such as 
pornography. 
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 Women who are raped or who are pregnant against their will must often deal with the 
consequences alone.  They are alternatively seen as transgressors of the social order, as bad 
women, or as victims.  Both of these judgments have degrading consequences for the image of 
woman; woman is either motivated primarily by sexual and maternal urges, or she is the weak 
and vulnerable victim who cannot choose or care for herself.  In this way the image of woman is 
morally degraded. 
 Rape and enforced pregnancy deny to women the freedom of person and of decision that 
men have, since women can be forced to reproduce and to fear for their safety.  But such 
freedom is part of our conception of full moral agency.  Furthermore, freedom of person and 
decision is required for one to be a political being.  The image of woman as vulnerable and weak 
makes it difficult for women to be taken seriously as candidates, and forces them to attempt to 
project a counter-image of extreme toughness and strength.  Thus women find it much more 
difficult to be political candidates or fully involved citizens.  And in this way enforced pregnan-
cy and rape make women, all women, even those who are never raped or never pregnant, lesser 
legal persons than men. 
 
 V. Implications of this argument 
 If enforced pregnancy harms all women in this deep and degrading sense as I have 
argued, it is a serious harm.  As long as women get pregnant and others are allowed to decide 
whether those women will remain pregnant, enforced pregnancy and its attendant harm 
continues.  Thus any discussion of abortion which ignores this degradation of women fails to 
take into account the most pervasive harm caused by the denial of abortion on demand.  But how 
are we to weigh this wrong against the alleged wrong of denying fetuses their supposed right to 
life?  Let us suppose for the moment that fetuses have a right to life, and that killing them is the 
killing of innocent persons.  If killing them is immoral, does it follow that enforcing pregnancy 
cannot be wrong, and hence not degrading?  On the analysis of degradation presented here a 
practice can degrade without being wrong if the degradation is warranted, though a practice 
which degrades a group may be said to be prima facie wrong.  Thus enforced pregnancy is 
degrading whether or not it is immoral to kill fetuses, though the question remains whether the 
degradation is justified.  In deciding that issue it is important to see that to enforce pregnancy is 
to degrade all women, even those who never become pregnant.  Although it is prima facie wrong 
to kill an innocent, there are sometimes circumstances in which it is justified.  For example, our 
society has justified the killing of innocents in the name of upholding the creed "all men are 
created equal".  In the case of pregnancy there are normally two parties who are responsible, 
though sometimes to different degrees.  Yet the woman is the one who bears the whole burden 
of the pregnancy, who must give up her body to a foreign object.  So we are faced with a vicious 
tradeoff: either enforced pregnancy is to be required and women are then made to be morally, 
legally, and socially unequal, or the innocents will be killed.  So the understanding of who 
counts as the "men" in our founding creed is contested in the decision to enforce pregnancy or to 
guarantee reproductive rights to women.   
 Since it would take us to far afield to examine criteria of personhood and the details of 
individual rights and duties to others, a full defense of abortion rights is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  I want to conclude, however, by drawing out the moral and political implications for 
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women if enforced pregnancy continues.  We have seen that enforced pregnancy denies equal 
political freedom to women as a group, and sacrifices women for other groups.  In denying 
abortion on demand, then, the state denies equal protection to half of its people.  But equal 
protection arguably underlies the state's claim to political legitimacy.  Thus, there remains no 
obligation on the part of women to continue to support that state, and resistance or disobedience 
is morally justified, if not required. 
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